USIB-D-9.1/8 29 July 1965

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR	THE UNITED	STATES INTELL	LIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT	٠	Implementation of Recommendation	25X <sup>2</sup>
			25X <sup>2</sup>
			25X

- 1. The enclosed memorandum on the subject and its attachment from the Chairman of the Security Committee is circulated herewith for USIB consideration of the recommendations in paragraph 5 of Mr. Osborn's memorandum. This paragraph recommends Board approval of the attachment which is a proposed USIB Policy Statement Establishing Security Inspection Minimum Requirements. If approved, paragraph 5 also recommends issuance of the Policy Statement on an unclassified basis.
- 2. The Chairman of the Security Committee has suggested that this matter be handled by vote sheet since Board discussion is not believed to be hecessary.

#### USIB Action Requested

3. Accordingly, Board members are requested to record their approval or other views concerning the Security Committee recommendations in paragraph 5 of the enclosed memorandum from the Chairman of the Security Committee. It is requested that the enclosed vote sheet be returned to the USIB Secretariat before the close of business on 5 August 1965.

Executive Secretary

Attachments

Perord of Board


action attaches

Approved For Release 2005/11/28: CIA RDP82M00997R0093000770004-8

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

- 3. The Committee strongly supported the necessity for periodically inspecting the adequacy of compliance with approved security policy, programs and procedures and found that effective periodic inspections were being conducted by the various community agencies. The Committee considered; however, that as an additional measure the establishment of uniform security inspection minimum requirements within the community would enhance the inspection programs and would give greater assurances as to the sufficiency of inspections conducted. The Committee, through a working group chaired by State, prepared a Policy Statement establishing minimum inspection requirements.
- 4. A matter of concern was the inspection authority resting outside of the intelligence component. The provision in the proposed statement for the Intelligence Chief in these instances to be provided a copy of the inspection report should serve to enhance the protection of intelligence personnel and installations. A similar effect will arise from the establishment of effective follow-up mechanisms to assure implementation of approved recommendations resulting from inspections. In determining security inspection minimum requirements, the Committee identified those programs and procedures which are an inherent part of an effective security program. The Committee recognized that specialized security fields such as technical countermeasures and programs governing access to and control of compartmented information on a community basis under agreed upon community directives were not within the scope of this study.
- 5. Accordingly, it is recommended that the attached proposed Policy Statement be approved and implemented. If approved and to permit wider dissemination, it is recommended that the Board authorize the issuance of the attached Policy Statement separately on an unclassified basis.



Attachment:

As stated

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#### USIB Policy Statement

#### Establishing

#### Security Inspection Minimum Requirements

In order to enhance the protection of intelligence personnel, intelligence information, installations and activities, the following security inspection minimum requirements are established by the USIB Member departments and agencies, including the military services intelligence chiefs. These inspection requirements are to be considered minimal and are not intended to preclude such additional security inspection requirements which the various departments and agencies deem appropriate. It is further recognized that the inspection function is the responsibility of each department and agency over its own personnel, installations and activities.

Security inspections should be conducted at appropriate intervals with frequency of inspection scheduling determined by assessment of the hostile threat. Professional security personnel should be assigned to this function whenever possible in order to insure that adequate security programs are maintained at all establishments wherein classified intelligence materials and/or programs are housed. Further, there should be a clear-cut assignment of security inspection responsibility and authority within the USIB Member departments and agencies, including the military service intelligence chiefs. In those instances wherein the inspection authority rests outside of the intelligence components, a copy of the report of inspection should be furnished to the intelligence chief in order to insure that appropriate security affecting intelligence is maintained. Further, there should be established an effective follow-up mechanism to insure that approved recommendations resulting from inspections are implemented.

It is not anticipated that all these requirements will be covered in the same order or during a given inspection. However, it is expected that all requirements will be covered, as appropriate, in the discharge

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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of their overall security responsibility by each USIB Member department and agency, including the military services intelligence chiefs.

Existing inspection programs should be reviewed and assessed to meet the provisions of this Policy Statement and revisions made as appropriate and necessary.

There follow the agreed-upon security inspection minimum requirements. The samples in parenthesis below are not to be considered as all inclusive.

- A. General Description of Location and Surrounding Area
- B. Physical Security
  - 1. Perimeter security (fences, lighting, gate control, patrols.)
  - 2. Security of the building in which classified material is located (construction, size, control points, location of guards, doors, windows, fire prevention program.)
  - 3. Security of working areas within building in which classified material is discussed, used or stored (level of classification, admittance and pass procedures, escort of char and other non-security cleared personnel, visual and audio vulnerability, after-hours procedures, use of alarms and other equipment.)
  - 4. Security of the storage of classified material (vaults, safes, and other facilities including key and combination controls)

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#### C. Procedures for Document Control

- 1. Document controls (logging, accountability, transmission, reproduction and receipt procedures.)
- 2. Retirement, downgrading and declassification procedures.
- 3. Security of the destruction of classified material (method, by whom).
- 4. Pouching system (procedures in registry area for delivery and receipt, courier, APO).

#### D. Communications

1. Type of facility (kinds of equipment, power).

3. Special provisions for security of area (location of offices, hours of operation, admittance and access control).

#### E. Personnel Security

- 1. Clearance procedures including scope of investigations, criteria for evaluation, levels of clearance authority and adjudication, recording, and validating or certifying clearances.
- 2. Security procedures relating to the employment of non-U. S. citizen support personnel at overseas installations.
- 3. Access and control procedures for personnel security files.
- 4. Security education program.

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### F. Emergency Conditions

- 1. Emergency plans (currency of plans for natural disasters and civil disturbances including evacuation of files and personnel, and the emergency destruction of classified material.)
- 2. Emergency communications (equipment available, location, signal plans, testing and maintenance.)
- G. General Findings and Observations
- H. Status of Previous Recommendations
- I. Recommendations

The above inspection requirements are to be considered in the context of the Policy Statement and are not intended to constitute a prescribed format for the conduct of inspections.

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USIB-D-9.1/8 29 July 1965

MEMO	RAN	DUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB
SUBJE	СТ	: USIB Vote Sheet Action
REFEF	RENC	CE: USIB-D-9.1/8, 29 July 1965
		n respect to the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 hment to reference:
	a,	I concur therein.
	b.	I concur therein, subject to the comments or amendments set forth in paragraph 2 below.*
	C.	I do not concur in this recommendation.  See comments below. *
2.	Com	ments or amendments:*
		(Signature)
		(Title)
(Date)		(Agency)

\*May necessitate classification and control of this memorandum.

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UNITED

STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

## VOTE SHEET ACTION

SUBJECT	Γ
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: Implementation of Rec.

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REFERENCE

USIB-D-9.1/8, 29 July 1965

DUE DATE

: COB 5 August

Agenc	У	Vote	Ву	Date
CIA	Concur		Mr. Helms	2 Aug
State	Concur		Mr. Hughes	5 Aug
DIA	Concur		Adm. Reed	4 Aug
NSA	Concur		Gen. Carter	4 Aug
AEC	Concur		Mr. Brown	4 Aug
FBI	Concur		Mr. Belmont	30 July
Remar	ks: The of	fice of the Secretary, S	Security Committee,	was informed
of this		. The Committee will		
		nt approved by the Boa		
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Approv	ed by DCI on	10 August 1965		
Record	USIB-N	И-398, Secretary's Not	е	